Abstract
Introduction
Emerging economies have been subject to increasingly volatile capital flows in recent years.
Sharp swings in volatility, witnessed in recent years, have created a number of challenges for macroeconomic management in these countries, and have reignited the debate on the extent to which emerging economies should subject themselves to the vagaries of capital flows. Moreover, it has been widely agreed that the sharp volatility in capital flows in recent years had little to do with developments in emerging economies. The events up to the collapse of the Lehman Brothers resulted in `flight to safety' of international capital from emerging economies driven by sharp decline in the risk appetite of global investors. The subsequent pickup in capital flows to emerging economies was a result of widening interest rate differentials due to extremely low interest rates prevailing in the industrialized countries. The worsening debt crisis in Europe and a downgrade of US sovereign rating in the second half of 2011 caused investor sentiment to deteriorate once again and net capital flows to plunge across most emerging economies.
The rise in volatility of capital flows has made macroeconomic management more complex.
Unbridled capital flows can exacerbate some of the existing financial fragilities and thereby lead to a costly crisis. Furthermore, massive unintended capital inflows can foster rapid real exchange rate appreciation, which can hurt exports of emerging economies. Alternatively, if the central bank intervenes to prevent the exchange rate from appreciating, it is likely to lead to an increase in money supply, fueling inflationary pressures. Many emerging economies have used fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies, intervention in the foreign exchange market, domestic prudential regulations and finally capital controls to counter the impact of volatile flows. The 3 latter has included tax on inflows, additional capital requirements for foreign exchange credit exposure, minimum holding period and withholding tax to manage capital flow volatility.
India, like other emerging economies, has been subject to these capricious capital flows in recent years. During the pre-global financial crisis (GFC) period, foreign capital poured into India driven by sustained differential in growth potential of the advanced economies and India, easy liquidity and declining home bias in the developed countries. However, this trend reversed with the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis resulting in a rapid outflow of capital. The quantitative easing in advanced countries and faster recovery in emerging economies caused capital flows to change direction again in 2010 and early 2011. The deepening of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis in the second half of 2011 and deteriorating domestic fundamentals resulted in capital
reversing direction yet again.
We focus on some of the challenges that have emanated from India's increased integration with global capital markets. India has adopted a gradual and calibrated approach while liberalizing the capital account. This has helped India to negotiate the macroeconomic trilemma -maintaining a stable exchange rate, keeping capital account open and retaining monetary policy autonomy. In particular, instead of corner solutions, India has opted for an intermediate regime balancing the policy objectives as per the demands of the macroeconomic situation. Capital account management measures also impact the foreign exchange market. We calculate the exchange market pressure (EMP) index in India, and track its evolution over the last couple of decades. We also evaluate the extent to which the EMP index has been influenced by major macroeconomic 4 factors. We find that a deteriorating trade balance and decline in portfolio equity inflows are associated with a higher EMP while positive changes in stock market returns lower the EMP.
Capital Account Management in India
Capital account liberalization in India has been viewed as a continuous process rather than a one off event. During the post-Independence period until the early 1980s, India had a relatively closed capital account with external financing mainly taking the form of assistance through multilateral and bilateral sources on concessional terms. This approach was associated with an import substitution strategy and relied on tariffs and quotas to limit the need for foreign exchange. During the 1980s, capital flows were liberalized as traditional sources of financing had to be supplemented with additional foreign capital to finance rising current account deficit driven by high oil prices, selective liberalization of imports and a sharp depreciation of the rupee.
The subsequent phase of liberalization was under the overall reform process that was initiated in 1991. On the external front, the reforms included dismantling of trade restrictions, move towards current account convertibility, a market determined exchange rate and gradual opening up of the capital account. However, with the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 in mind, India prioritized certain flows and agents in the liberalization process. In particular, non-debt flows were preferred to debt flows. Currently, barring a few sectors, foreign direct investment (FDI) is universally allowed with some of the sensitive sectors being subject to caps. Portfolio flows have also witnessed significant liberalization, though there still exist separate investment caps on sub accounts of foreign institutional investors (FIIs), individual FII and aggregate FII investments in a company. In contrast, debt flows are subject to 5 numerous restrictions including eligibility conditions for borrowers and lenders, minimum maturity period, ceilings on interest rate spread and end-use restrictions. Registered FIIs such as pension funds, mutual funds, investment trusts etc. and QFIs are allowed to invest in equity. The ceiling for overall investment for FIIs and QFIs are 24% and 10% of the paid up capital of the company. The ceiling for FII investment can be raised up to the sectoral cap, subject to the approval of the board and the general body passing a special resolution to that effect. The limit is 20% of the paid up capital in the case of public sector banks.
NRIs and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) can invest in equity up to 10% of the paid up capital of the Indian company, which can be raised to 24% subject to the approval of the general body. Holders of Overseas Citizenship of India certificates have the same rights to invest in India as NRIs (except to invest in agricultural land).
QFIs can invest in those mutual fund (MF) schemes that hold at least 25% of their assets in infrastructure sector under the $3 billion sub-limit for investment in MFs related to infrastructure.
The overall limit on residents' investments in companies listed abroad is $200,000 a year. Resident corporations may invest up to 50% of their net worth in shares of listed companies abroad.
Indian Mutual Funds are permitted to invest within an overall cap of $ 7 billion.
Portfolio Bond Investments
Registered FIIs may invest in debt securities issued by Indian corporates with an overall limit of $20 billion, with an additional limit of $25 billion in infrastructure bonds and a $20 billion limit on government securities. The investor base for G-Secs has been widened to include SWFs, multilateral agencies, insurance and pension funds. Infrastructure bonds have mandatory holding period. Different limits apply to NRIs.
Only resident individuals may invest in debt securities abroad subject to a yearly limit of $200,000.
Investments in money market
Only NRIs may invest in money market mutual funds.
Residents may purchase these instruments abroad without RBI approval.
Derivatives
These transactions are generally subject to limits and approval. Hedging of nonresidents' investments in India is allowed.
Commercial banks may purchase such instruments for their asset and liability management. Resident companies may use derivatives to hedge commodity price and foreign exchange debt exposures. Loans ECBs are allowed through automatic and approval route. ECBs through automatic route are subject to a cap of $20 million for a minimum three-year average Lending abroad is generally subject to approval, except for certain trade credits and lending to foreign subsidiaries. maturity and $750 million for a minimum five-year average maturity. ECBs through approval route can be higher than $750 million. External loans are subject to an all-in-cost ceiling and end-use restrictions. Source: IMF (2012) and various RBI and SEBI notifications. Table 1 Economic Forum ranked India 40 out of the 62 countries covered, with India ranking poorly on institutional and business environment, financial stability and access as well as banking services.
The calibrated liberalization of the capital account was also driven by fiscal deficit and inflation rates in India being consistently higher than international levels. Both RBI (2006) and Planning
Commission (2009) With the surge in capital flow persisting and the inflationary and currency pressures not abating the government introduced a series of measures to regulate the flow of foreign capital inflows. A majority of these measures were imposed on debt flows such as capping of corporates' access to foreign currency funds, restrictions on conversion of foreign currency loans into Rupees, and reduction in ceilings on interest rate for foreign borrowings. Moreover, the use of Participatory Notes (PNs), an offshore derivative product, allowing overseas investors to participate in the Indian stock market was banned while interest rates on non-resident deposits were also lowered.
To evaluate the efficacy of some of the measures aimed at managing capital inflow, we look at the currency and stock price movements before and after the introduction of these measures. To be deemed effective, these measures must reverse or at least slowdown the rate of change observed prior to their introduction. Figure 2 and Table 2 Our simple analysis indicates that the introduction of capital control measures did not always lead to a reversal or even a slowdown in the rate of exchange rate appreciation or the stock prices. However, this is not to conclude that these measures were ineffective, due to the absence of counterfactuals. Moreover, to rigorously estimate the efficacy of capital controls, one would have to also look the impact of these measures on the volume and composition of flows (Patnaik and Shah, 2011) and the extent to which they allowed policymakers maneuverability in monetary and exchange rate management. We focus on this point in the next section.
3.
Negotiating the Trilemma India's increased integration with the global capital markets during the last two decades has increased the complexity of macroeconomic management in India. In particular, India had to negotiate the well-known macroeconomic trilemma. The standard formulation of the trilemma argues that it is impossible to attain monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and capital market integration simultaneously. Only two of the three objectives can be obtained at a particular point in time. India, like other emerging economies, seeks to achieve each of the three objectives with varying degrees. While capital flows aid growth by providing external capital to sustain an excess of investment over domestic savings, a competitive exchange rate helps to maintain a sustainable current account balance and an independent monetary policy stabilizes the economy in the face of domestic and exogenous shocks. However, given the impossibility of attaining the three goals simultaneously, India had to balance the conflicting objectives.
Moreover, the sharp increase in the volatility of capital flows during recent years has created a tension between monetary management and exchange rate management. As discussed in Section 2, excessive capital inflows have been found to result in rapid real exchange rate appreciation, which in turn hurts exports of emerging economies. Even a short-term appreciation can have lingering implications like permanent loss of export market share and reductions in manufacturing capacity. Alternatively, if the central bank intervenes to prevent the exchange rate from appreciating, it is likely to lead to an increase in money supply, fueling inflationary pressures.
In this section, we analyze India's management of the macroeconomic trilemma, the extent to which India has been bound by the trilemma and whether the trilemma has remained underutilized. Following Aizenman et al. (2010a, b) we quantify the various policy objectives under the trilemma. We use quarterly data and cover the period 1996-97Q1 to 2011-12Q3. Our coverage is dictated by the availability of the data at a quarterly frequency, especially data on GDP. where and i i and i j are the 3-month Treasury Bill rates for India and the US respectively. This index can theoretically take a value between 0 and 1 with a higher value indicating greater degree of monetary independence. We find that for India the index ranges between 0.11 and 0.85. Hence we rescale this index to lie between 0 and 1.
Monetary Independence (MI)
Following
Exchange Rate Stability (ERS)
We make use of the methodology introduced by Frankel and Wei (1994) to create an index of exchange rate stability. The degree of influence that major global currencies have on Indian
Rupee can be estimated using the following estimation model
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( 2) where is the exchange rate of currency i against the numèraire currency, which in this case is the Swiss franc and the currency i can be the US Dollar, Japanese Yen and the Euro. For the period prior to the introduction of the Euro, we consider the German Deutsche Mark. Under this estimation, which is the estimated coefficient on the rate at which currency i depreciates against the numèraire currency indicates the weight of currency i in the basket. In the case where the currency under observation is pegged to a particular currency or a basket of currency we will have or for the i currencies that are a part of the basket. Moreover, pegging to an individual or a basket of currencies implies a higher goodness of fit. In our estimation we use daily data, with the data being sourced from the Reserve Bank of India and Global Financial Database. We apply the estimation over a quarter and take the goodness of fit, or the adjusted R 2 as the measure of exchange rate stability. A higher R 2 indicates greater pegging to an individual or a basket of currencies. Again, we normalize the index so that it lies between 0 and 1.
Capital Account Openness (KO)
The index of capital account openness is based on a de facto measure instead of a de jure one as it is the volume of flows that creates a conflict between monetary independence and exchange rate stability as opposed to controls governing the movement of capital. A country with high de jure openness can have low capital flows and hence may be able to simultaneously stabilize exchange rate and retain monetary autonomy. Alternatively, a country with low de jure openness can witness large flows due to lax capital controls, and face a trade-off between ensuring monetary independence and exchange rate stability. The index of capital account openness is 15 based on net capital flows. The index is constructed as the ratio of absolute value of net capital flows to GDP.
The focus on net capital flows is based on the fact that it is the capital account balance that is crucial for the trilemma. If capital inflows in a country were to be matched by an equal amount of outflows, the policymaker can retain monetary independence with a stable exchange rate.
Finally, to make this index comparable with others, we normalize it to lie between 0 and 1.
In Figure 3 , we highlight the evolution of the three indices over the period 1996-97Q1 to 2011- As pointed out in Aizenman et al (2010a, b) , policymakers can garner greater flexibility vis-à-vis monetary and exchange rate management in the short run by accumulating or depleting reserves.
Consequently we also focus on , the absolute change in reserves (as a percentage of GDP). Like other indices we also normalize to lie between 0 and 1. Figure 4 shows the average of the various policy dimensions during the four phases. Across the phases, the rise in capital account openness has been associated with a drop in exchange rate stability. The index of monetary independence witnessed a drop in Phase II but recovered in subsequent phases.
Figure 4: Configuration of the Trilemma Objectives and International Reserves
Source: Authors' calculations Next, we examine the validity of the trilemma framework by testing whether the weighted sum of the three trilemma policy variables adds up to a constant -here set to be 2. We estimate the relationship for the entire period as well as the four phases outlined above. The results are given in Table 3 . We find that the overall fit is extremely high with R 2 being above 0.93 across all the specifications. While the estimates for exchange rate stability and capital account openness are significant across all the specifications, it is not the case with monetary independence. To obtain the contribution of each trilemma policy orientation we multiply the coefficients with the average for each phase. The results are outlined in Figure 5 increasing the interest rate on NRI deposits were undertaken to attract greater capital inflows. At the same time a more independent monetary policy was pursued to bolster the Indian economy. 
Impact on the Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI)

Measurements and Evolution of EMP Indices
The RBI's management of capital account could be driven by a desire to moderate certain types of capital inflows or to manage exchange rate stability. It may be reasonable to conjecture that the goal was the latter in the context of financial trilemma. Accordingly we measure the exchange market pressure (EMP) in India, discuss its evolution over time and analyze a few crucial macroeconomic factors that may have affected the EMP over the last couple of decades.
EMP is a combination of exchange rate depreciation and international reserves loss-a concept pioneered by Girton and Roper (1977) , and applied frequently in the analysis of EMEs (Frankel, 2009) . A positive (negative) EMP indicates a net excess demand (supply) for foreign currency, accompanied by a combination of reserve loss (gain) and currency depreciation (appreciation).
In order to measure EMP in India, we follow Aizenman et al. (2012) 
where stands for nominal Rupee exchange rate per U.S. dollar and denotes international reserve holdings (excluding gold) by India during quarter t. and denote changes in nominal exchange rate and international reserve holdings respectively between quarters t and t-1.
Our second measure, EMP (IR/M-Base), is defined as the un-weighted sum of percentage exchange rate depreciation and reserve loss, with reserve loss deflated by the monetary base:
where M i,t-1 stands for M2 in local currency units of India in quarter t-1, and the monetary base is converted to U.S. dollars. According to the monetary model-based EMP measure popularized by Girton and Roper (1977) , specification (2) again given the massive currency depreciation that India has been experiencing in the wake of the Euro-zone sovereign debt crisis.
Estimation of EMP determinants
In this sub-section we use a multivariate time-series regression framework in order to estimate the link between EMP and a few selected explanatory variables. The objective is to quantify the statistical as well as economic significance of these factors in accounting for exchange market pressure patterns over the sample period. Following Aizenman et al. (2012) in our first specification we include trade balance to GDP ratio, share of net FDI inflows and net portfolio equity inflows in GDP separately and we also control for year on year WPI (wholesale price index) inflation. 5 Estimation results are reported in Table 4 . The three columns pertain to the three different EMP measures as detailed in the previous section. The last two measures are used as dependent variables in the time-series regressions as robustness check for our baseline results on column 1.
As can be seen from column 1 of Table 4 , a deteriorating trade balance is associated with a higher EMP, a result that makes intuitive sense. When EMP is standardized or deflated by monetary base, the estimated coefficient of trade balance continues to have the predicted sign, but it is no longer statistically significant. An increase in net portfolio equity inflows lowers the EMP. This effect is both statistically and economically significant. For instance a 10 percentage points rise (decline) in portfolio equity inflows (outflows) is associated with a 16.7 percentage points lower EMP when measured using the un-weighted index. The association between EMP and equity flows is also robust to the normalization of reserves by monetary base as well as standardization of the EMP index. Neither inflation nor the share of net FDI inflows in GDP seems to have any significant impact on the EMP over the sample period.
6 We had also incorporated percentage change in stock market returns (BSE Index) as well as the ratio of short-term external debt to GDP in the EMP estimations. Stock market returns happened to be highly correlated with WPI inflation and trade balance. When added without these two explanatory variables in the regression, stock market returns were found to be significantly associated with EMP measured using all three indices. In other words, positive changes in stock returns lower the EMP and vice versa. Quarterly data on short-term external debt is available only from 2006Q1 onwards from the Quarterly External Debt Statistics (QEDS) database maintained jointly by the BIS-IMF-World Bank. When added to the estimation, external debt was found to be negatively associated with EMP-a lower short-term external debt ratio increases the EMP, but the effect was found to be statistically significant only for the un- 6 We also conducted the estimation using Newey-West standard errors and results came out to be the same.
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weighted EMP index. These results are not reported here for brevity but are available upon request. Our results thus primarily highlight the importance of portfolio equity flows and also stock market returns to some extent, in accounting for exchange market pressure in India from 1990Q1 to 2011Q4.
5.
Co-ordination in Capital Controls: Role of G20
In recent times there has been a widespread debate among economists and policy makers regarding the efficacy of capital controls in managing volatile cross-border capital flows. While capital controls and similar macro-prudential measures are useful in ensuring macroeconomic and financial stability in countries especially during times of sudden stops and surges, there are considerable risks involved as recently highlighted by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. A coordinated approach across countries in implementing capital controls is likely to be more effective than unilateral actions, given that any prudential measure adopted to tackle capital flow volatility is bound to have cross-border spillover effects, often times putting the burden of adjustment on other countries.
As argued by Ostry, Ghosh and Korinek (2012) , one of the reasons why countries may wish to impose capital controls on inflows is to maintain an undervalued currency thereby sustaining a current account surplus. By restricting capital inflows, the debtor country may seek to manipulate the inter-temporal terms of trade in its favor. Such a unilateral policy action by one country is likely to have a beggar-thy-neighbor impact by forcing a situation of current-account deficit on the importing country. Alternatively, if countries use capital controls in order to mitigate the risks associated with volatile foreign borrowing, it is likely to magnify the macro-27 financial stability risks for other countries by diverting the unwanted, volatile flows to countries that are less able to absorb the same. Within such a multilateral context, coordination across countries may be useful in producing a globally efficient outcome, especially when imposition of capital controls is associated with welfare costs.
Thus, any decision by a country to impose capital controls may need to take into account the associated multilateral repercussions. And here the G20 can play an effective role by ensuring that the severity of boom-bust cycles in capital flows is mitigated through cooperation and coordination among its member countries thereby fostering global financial stability. In this context it maybe worthwhile to mention that India, a major emerging economy adopted a series of financial liberalization measures since 1991 and these have mostly been unidirectional since then. Barring a couple of exceptional instances, India has not used capital controls unilaterally to manage volatile capital flows.
Conclusion
The recent increase in volatility of global capital flows has reignited the debate about appropriate capital flow management measures. Volatile capital flows tend to complicate macroeconomic management by aggravating real exchange rate misalignment, excesses in credit market, asset price booms and busts and exacerbating overall financial fragility. Furthermore, they complicate the policy trade-offs related to current account deficit, exchange rate, inflation, availability of external capital to finance investment, and reserve holdings. These policy dilemmas reiterate the need to actively manage capital flows. This can be achieved through a gamut of policy measures 28 of which capital controls are a part. Relying exclusively on the latter would be erroneous-capital controls can be effective, but are not always foolproof, and are vulnerable to leakages through financial engineering.
India's experience highlights the adoption of a calibrated approach towards capital account liberalization to minimize risks associated with financial fragilities and macroeconomic distortions. Furthermore, in dealing with capital flows India has resorted to a multiple instrument approach encompassing capital flow management measures, increasingly flexible exchange rate regime with the RBI intervening from time to time, sterilization of these interventions through multiple instruments like MSS bonds and CRR, and building up of a stockpile of reserves.
India has navigated the well-known macroeconomic trilemma by embracing an intermediate approach, and balancing the policy objectives as per the demands of the macroeconomic situation. In recent years, a shift towards greater monetary policy autonomy to tackle growing domestic inflationary pressure has been balanced with greater flexibility of the exchange rate.
In order to assess the impact of capital account management on the foreign exchange market, we also focus on the exchange market pressure (EMP) index and analyze its various macroeconomic determinants. We find that EMP has exhibited a great deal of fluctuation in India during the period 1990 to 2010 due to global and domestic events and has primarily been affected by changes in the trade balance, portfolio equity inflows and stock market fluctuations.
